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This article considers whether States have obligations, in international law, to proactively 
integrate environmental and social considerations into economic decision-making for 
sustainable development. In an era of international cooperation shaped inter-actionally 
by several decades of global debate, culminating in the adoption of universal Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) at the United Nations, the article considers opportunities 
to support sustainable development through the interpretation and implementation of 
international economic treaty law and practice. In particular, the article comparatively 
discusses a new generation of trade and investment treaties that explicitly mention sustainable 
development as part of the object and purpose, examining approaches which can define and 
characterise the Parties’ commitments. The article briefly offers considerations for a regulator, 
arbitrator or jurist seeking to interpret, in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties1 (“VCLT”), a diverse range of environmental and social development 
provisions that are increasingly being integrated into international economic agreements.
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1. 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980) 
[VCLT].
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I. Policy and “Soft Law” Rationales for Addressing Social and 
Environmental Concerns in Economic Treaties
II. International Legal Reasons for Countries to Address Environmental 
and Social Impacts of Trade and Investment Agreements
A. Sustainable Development as an Interstitial Norm
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Trade and Sustainable Development
III. International Trade and Investment Agreements in Light of the 
Integration Principle
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Investment Agreements through Integration
B. Interpreting Sustainable Development Provisions in Economic 
Accords
IV. Conclusions
We assume a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen the 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development - 
economic development, social development and environmental protection - at 
the local, national, regional and global levels.2
When States commit to promote sustainable development in a trade or investment treaty, or agree to conduct their economic 
relations in accordance with a principle of sustainable development, the 
implications of this commitment are not obvious in international law or 
policy.
In recent decades, there has been extensive international treaty-making 
on the protection of the environment. Many multilateral environmental 
accords (“MEAs”) contain provisions to secure sustainable development 
2. Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development, UNWSSD (4 
September 2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 1 at para 5 [Johannesburg 
Declaration].
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in different ways, across diverse fields.3 Parallel to these MEAs, 
international economic treaties are being negotiated and adopted. While 
it is less documented, a growing number of these accords also address 
sustainable development, including in the World Trade Organisation4 
(“WTO”) and an increasing range of Regional Trade Agreements5. As 
the WTO Appellate Body noted in the 1998 US-Shrimp Dispute:6 
[t]he preamble of the WTO Agreement — which informs not only the GATT 
1994, but also the other covered agreements — explicitly acknowledges “the 
objective of sustainable development”.7
The WTO also recognised in the corresponding footnote that “[t]his 
concept has been generally accepted as integrating economic and social 
3. Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, International Environmental Law 
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004); Patricia Birnie, 
Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, International Law & the Environment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 106-14; Philippe Sands, 
Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at 252-66 [Sands, Principles of International 
Environmental Law]; Sumudu A Atapattu, Emerging Principles of 
International Environmental Law (Ardsley, NY: Transnational Publishers, 
2006) at 140-45; David Hunter, James Salzman & Durwood Zaelke, 
International Environmental Law and Policy (New York: Foundation Press, 
2002) at 19, 923.
4. Gary P Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development (Tokyo: United 
Nations University Press, 2005); Markus W Gehring & Marie-Claire 
Cordonier Segger, eds, Sustainable Development in World Trade Law 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005) at 129-52; Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994 1867, UNTS 
154 (entered into force 1 January 15) [WTO Agreement]. 
5. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, “Sustainable Development in Regional 
Trade Agreements” in Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino, eds, Regional 
Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2006) at 313-40.
6. WTO, United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products — Report of the Panel, WTO Doc WT/DS58/R (1998); WTO, 
United States: Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products — 
Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (1998) [Shrimp 
Products, Appellate Body]; collectively [US-Shrimp].
7. Shrimp Products, Appellate Body ibid at n 107.
162 
 
Cordonier Segger, Inspiration for Integration: Sustainable Development
development and environmental protection”.8
There may be sound policy reasons for this economic law trend. 
As will be discussed below, the principle that environmental priorities 
must be integrated in economic development decision-making is gaining 
traction,9 and international trade and investment law and policy is part 
of economic decision-making. The need to take both environmental 
and social priorities into account in efforts to achieve sustainable 
economic development is also increasingly recognised, as reflected 
in the consensus of the United Nations in the 2015 Declaration on 
Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
with its 17 universal Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”), in the 
2012 Declaration on The Future We Want from the UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development, in the 2002 outcomes of World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (“WSSD”), and other inter-actional 
international discussions.10 However, there remains comparatively little 
legal scholarship or analysis on how trade and investment rules can 
affect a State’s potential for sustainable development, and how trade and 
investment treaties might be interpreted to foster rather than frustrate 
8. Ibid at para 129.
9. Award in the Arbitration Regarding the Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway 
(Kingdom of Belgium v Kingdom of the Netherlands) (2005), 2007 
Permanent Court of Arbitration Award Series at paras 58-59 (Permanent 
Court of Arbitration) [Iron Rhine].
10. Johannesburg Declaration, supra note 2; The Future We Want (27 July 2012) 
UN Doc A/RES/66/288; Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development (25 September 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1 
[Transforming our World].
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sustainable development.11 
Do States have binding hard, customary or soft law obligations, 
in international law, to proactively integrate environmental and 
social considerations into economic decision-making for sustainable 
development? If sustainable development commitments are taken 
seriously, what does this mean for international economic treaty law and 
practice? This article analyses a new generation of trade and investment 
treaties relating to sustainable development, examining approaches 
which can define and characterise Parties’ commitments to sustainable 
development. The article briefly discusses options for a regulator, 
arbitrator or jurist seeking to interpret, in accordance with the VCLT, 
an increasingly diverse range of environmental and social development 
provisions found today in economic agreements.
I. Policy and “Soft Law” Rationales for Addressing 
Social and Environmental Concerns in Economic 
Treaties
Commitments to sustainable development are increasingly found, not 
just as provisions of environmental agreements, but also in accords related 
mainly to human rights and social concerns, and in treaties focused 
on economic development.12 This should not be surprising. Taken 
together, the range of trade and investment treaty impact assessments 
11. See Alan Boyle & David Freestone, International Law and Sustainable 
Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 10 in which 
trade is identified as an area where scope for integration or conflict 
remains and Hans Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt, eds, Sustainable 
Development in International and National Law (Groningen: Europa Law 
Publishing, 2009) at 271-95 which calls for new research on sustainable 
development in economic law. See also Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra 
note 3 at 117 identifying international trade as an area with “significant 
scope for improvement” for integration of environmental considerations, 
and Vaughan Lowe, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) at 4 [Lowe, International Law].
12. See e.g. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable 
Development Law: Principles, Practice and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).
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commissioned by States over recent decades raises concerns about the 
potential effects of new global and regional economic agreements.13 
Assessment findings suggest that trade and investment liberalisation 
agreements can lead to environmental and social impacts. Potential 
and actual impacts may depend on the specifics of each accord, which 
are often shaped by pre-existing economic relationships of the trading 
partners, the types of industries and sectors that are stimulated by the 
treaty, the perceived effectiveness of existing measures to protect or 
improve environmental protection and social development in relation 
to trade and investment led economic growth within the territory of the 
Parties to the accord, and other factors. 
One response to concerns regarding impacts of trade treaties, 
advocated by neo-liberal economic and legal scholars, may be to simply 
let burdens fall where they may.14 From this view, sovereign States 
negotiate trade treaties, and are surely in the best position to decide what 
13. See e.g. Gehring & Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in World 
Trade Law, supra note 5; Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Markus W 
Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, eds, Sustainable Development in World 
Investment Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2011). 
See also online compilations of EU Sustainability Impact Assessments 
of Trade Agreements, US Environmental Reviews of Trade Agreements, 
US Labour Reviews of Trade Agreements, Canadian Environmental 
Assessments of Trade Agreements, etc.
14. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism as Freedom (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962) at 57-58; Robert A Lawson, “Economic Freedom 
and the Well-Being of Nations” in Emily Chamlee-Wright, ed, The Annual 
Proceedings of the Wealth and Well-Being of Nations (Beloit: Beloit College 
Press, 2010) 65 at 67-69; Jennifer Schultz, “The Demise of ‘Green’ 
Protectionism: The WTO Decision on the US Gasoline Rule” (1996) 
25 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 1 at 3-5; Simon J 
Evenett & John Whalley, “Resist green protectionism - or pay the price at 
Copenhagen” in Richard Baldwin & Simon J Evenett, eds, The Collapse of 
Global Trade, Murky Protectionism and the Crisis: Recommendations for the 
G20 (London: VoxEU.org and Center for Economic and Policy Research, 
2009) 93.
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risks and impacts are most acceptable to their national interests.15 Just as 
the benefits of trade agreements will accrue to those States most astute 
in securing them, so should the costs fall upon the governments and 
citizens of those less wary.16 Higher social and environmental standards 
may even be inappropriate to the special circumstances of certain States, 
limiting the comparative advantages of developing countries in trade.17 
Attempts to address or integrate social and environmental concerns into 
trade negotiations, from such perspectives, would be simply “disguised 
protectionism”, to be rejected or at least addressed separately from “pure” 
economic law.18 From this view, the only purpose of a trade or investment 
agreement is to accelerate economic growth by exploiting comparative 
advantage, and any other “non-trade” issue should be regarded with 
extreme caution.19 For many, however, this position is no longer realistic, 
due to both policy and emerging inter-actional legal reasons.
Recent decades of trade and investment treaty-making take place 
against a backdrop of broader international policy debates in which States 
have not been silent on linkages with environmental, human rights, and 
sustainable development considerations. Legal literature covers trade 
15. See Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, “The Relationship 
between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law” 
(1998) 1 Journal of International Economic Law 83 at 84-86 on pacta 
sunt servanda in the WTO. 
16. Ibid at 120-22.
17. Friedman, supra note 14 at 56-58 and Evenett & Whalley, supra note 14 
at 93-96.
18. US National Foreign Trade Council, “Enlightened” Environmentalism or 
Disguised Protectionism? Assessing the Impact of EU Precautionary-Based 
Standards on Developing Countries (Washington: National Foreign Trade 
Council, 2004) at iv-vii.
19. Richard N Cooper, Environment and Resource Policies for the World 
Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994); letter from Jagdish 
N Bhagwati (1999) on “Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement 
Against Linkage” (drafted by Bhagwati and signed by several dozen 
academics, copy on file with author). 
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and investment linkages with human rights,20 as canvassed in the 1995 
Copenhagen United Nations Conference on Social Development,21 
the 2002 Monterrey International Conference on Financing for 
Development,22 and later events. Environmental aspects of these 
global policy debates are also documented in the leading international 
environmental law texts.23 International debates on globalisation are 
also analysed in studies of international law in the field of sustainable 
development.24 On sustainable development, international discussions 
began before the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment25 (“UNCHE”) and were informed by the 1987 World 
Commission on Environment and Development (“WCED”) mandate26 
20. See Rumu Sarkar, International Development Law: Rule of Law, Human 
Rights and Global Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 257-
331(for human rights in the context of global finance); see also Olivier 
De de Schutter, “Transnational Corporations as Instruments of Human 
Development” in Philip Alston and Mary Robinson, Human Rights and 
Development: Towards Mutual Reinforcement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005) 403. 
21. World Summit for Social Development (6-12 March 1995) Copenhagen, 
Denmark, online: <www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/text-version/>.
22. International Conference on Financing for Development (18-22 March 
2002), Monterrey, Nuevo León, Mexico, online: <www.un.org/esa/ffd/
ffdconf/>. 
23. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 3 at 
25-69; Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3 at 106-208; Kiss & 
Shelton, supra note 3 at 67, 51; Hunter, Salzman & Zaelke, International 
Environmental Law and Policy, supra note 3 at 210; Birnie, Boyle & 
Redgwell, ibid at 106-14; Atapattu, supra note 3 at 140-45.
24. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, ibid at 231; Hans 
Christian Bugge “1987-2007: Our Common Future Revisited” in Hans 
Christian Bugge & Christina Voigt, eds, Sustainable Development in 
International and National Law (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 
2008) at 271-95. 
25. (5-16 June 1972), Stockholm, Sweden, online: <sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/milestones/humanenvironment>.
26. Process of preparation of the Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 
and Beyond, GA Res 16, UNGAOR, 38th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/38/16 
(1983) [UNGA, Process of preparation].
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and Report.27 Through the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development28 (“UNCED”), a series of regional sustainable development 
summits such as the 1996 Summit of the Americas on Sustainable 
Development,29 the 1997 United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on Sustainable Development,30 and the 2002 WSSD, a certain 
consensus on the challenges began to emerge. In an attempt to address 
these challenges constructively, in the 2012 United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development,31 States called for a “green economy in the 
context of sustainable development and poverty eradication”.32 
Through the ‘soft law’ consensus declarations emerging from these 
27. World Commission on Environment and Development, Report of the 
World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 
1987, UN Doc A/42/427 [WCED, Our Common Future].
28. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UNCED (3-14 June 
1992) A/CONF.151/26 Vol 1, online: <sustainabledevelopment.un.org/
milestones/unced> [Rio Declaration].
29. Declaration of Santa Cruz de la Sierra Summit of the Americas on 
Sustainable Development (7-8 December 1996) Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 
Bolivia, online: <www.summit-americas.org/summit_sd.html>.
30. Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21: Report of 
the Special Session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the 
Implementation of Agenda 21 23-28 June 1997 (19 September 1997) UN 
Doc A/RES/S-19/2, New York, online: <www.un.org/esa/earthsummit/> 
[UNGASS, Programme for Further Implementation].
31. The Future We Want, supra note 10.
32. See Report of the Second Committee (Economic and Financial), UNGAOR, 
64th Sess, UN Doc A/64/420/Add.1 (2009) (on Implementation of 
Agenda 21, the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 
21, and Outcomes of the World Summit on Sustainable Development). 
See also Commission on Sustainable Development, Fifth Committee 
Report, UNCSDOR, 1997, UN Doc A/64/600.
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events,33 it is possible to trace a growing clarification of the relationship 
between trade and investment law, and sustainable development. These 
debates reveal sound policy justifications for the proposal that negative 
social and environmental impacts of trade liberalisation should not 
simply be left to “fall where they may” onto the most vulnerable groups 
in developing State Parties to economic agreements, or kept completely 
separate from trade and investment policy.
The 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment34 (“Stockholm Declaration”), by focusing on the need for 
33. “Soft law” describes high level declarations of intent, consensus 
declarations agreed by States, technical standards, codes of conduct and 
guidelines that are not aligned with the classical sources of law defined 
in the United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 18 
April 1946, TS 993, 39 AJIL Supp 215 art 38 [SICJ]. One nuanced 
understanding of “soft law” suggests that in certain circumstances, such 
declarations can still give rise to legitimate expectations among States. 
For discussion see Gerry Simpson, “The Situation on the International 
Legal Theory Front: The Power of Rules and the Rule of Power” (2000) 
11:2 European Journal of International Law 439; Joseph HH Weiler 
& Andreas L Paulus, “The Structure of Change in International Law 
or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law?” (1997) 8 
European Journal of International Law 545; Ulrich Fastenrath, “Relative 
Normativity in International Law” (1993) 4 European Journal of 
International Law 305; Tadensz Grnchalla-Wesierski, “A Framework for 
Understanding Soft Law” (1984) 30 McGill Law Journal 37; Michael 
Bothe, “Legal and Non-Legal Norms – A Meaningful Distinction 
in International Relations?” (1980) 11 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 65; Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern, “International 
Economic Soft Law” (1980) 163 Collected Courses of the Hague 
Academy of International Law 164; Joseph Gold, “Strengthening the Soft 
International Law of Exchange Arrangements” (1983) 77:3 American 
Journal of International Law 443. But see Christine Chinkin, “The 
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law” 
(1989) 38:4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850 and 
Hartmut Hillgenberg, “A Fresh Look at Soft Law” (1999) 10:3 European 
Journal of International Law 499.
34. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 
UNGAOR, 1972, UN Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev.1 3 [Stockholm 
Declaration].
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financial assistance and economic stability, in Principles 9 and 10 located 
“the debate on the environment clearly in the context of the international 
economy”.35 States also recognised in Principle 8, that “economic and 
social development is essential ... for the improvement of the quality of 
life”,36 and agreed in Principle 14 on the need for rational planning to 
reconcile conflicts “between the needs of development and the need to 
protect and improve the environment”.37 The UNCHE also increased the 
impetus for certain MEAs that use specific trade obligations as incentives 
to secure compliance, such as the Montreal Protocol.38 
After Stockholm, the 1983 WCED was given a mandate to discuss 
trade matters.39 In its seminal 1987 Report, Our Common Future,40 the 
WCED called for a “sustainable world economy”.41 At that time, the 
WCED also found that: 
… these issues have not been taken up systematically by intergovernmental 
organizations. The mandates of … GATT and UNCTAD — should include 
sustainable development. Their activities should reflect concern with the 
impacts of trading patterns on the environment and the need for more 
effective instruments to integrate environment and development concerns into 
35. Lowe, International Law, supra note 11 at 253.
36. Ibid at 8.
37. Ibid at 14.
38. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, 3 March 1973, 993 UNTS 243 (entered into force 1 July 1975); 
Duncan Brack, ed, Trade and Environment: Conflict or Compatibility? 
(London: Earthscan, 1998) at 323; Duncan Brack, International Trade 
and the Montreal Protocol (London: RIIA and Earthscan, 1996); Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 
1522 UNTS 3 arts 2, 4 (entered into force 1 January 1989); Basel 
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes 
and their Disposal, 22 March 1989, 1673 UNTS 57 arts 3-6, 8-9 (entered 
into force 5 May 1992); United Nations Environment Programme & 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, Environment and 
Trade: A Handbook, 2d (Winnipeg: UNEP and IISD, 2005) [UNEP & 
IISD, Environment and Trade].
39. UNGA, Process of preparation, supra note 26.
40. WCED, Our Common Future, supra note 27.
41. Ibid at para 41.
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international trading arrangements …42 
Agreed by consensus in the 1992 UNCED, the 1992 Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development43 (“Rio Declaration”) and Agenda 
2144 further elaborated the links between economic law and sustainable 
development.45 At Principle 2, States recognised both their sovereign 
rights to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
and developmental policies, and their responsibility to ensure they do not 
cause damage to others.46 Principle 27 calls for “the further development 
of international law in the field of sustainable development”, and 
Principle 12 focuses on international trade, calling for a “supportive and 
open international economic system that would lead to economic growth 
and sustainable development”.47 In Principle 4, States declared that “in 
order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it”.48 The Rio Declaration also highlighted 
the need for procedural innovations such as impact assessment and 
public participation mechanisms. Agenda 21 called for further efforts to 
codify and develop “international law on sustainable development”,49 and 
recognises the need to bring international economic law into accordance 
with the rest of this international law.50 Although a section on “making 
42. Ibid at paras 55-56.
43. Rio Declaration, supra note 28.
44. Agenda 21, UNGAOR, 46th Sess 21, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (1992) 
[Agenda 21].
45. Rio Declaration, supra note 28. See also Experts Group on Environmental 
Law of the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (London: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1987) which was a key input to the 1992 Rio Declaration.
46. Rio Declaration, ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. See especially analysis in Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3 at 
116-23. 
49. Agenda 21, supra note 44 at para 39.1(a).
50. Ibid at paras 39.1-39.10
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trade and the environment mutually supportive” is mainly cited,51 policy 
guidance on trade, investment and sustainable development for States is 
actually found throughout Agenda 21 in diverse sections on social and 
economic dimensions,52 conservation and management of resources for 
development,53 strengthening the role of major groups,54 and various 
means of implementation.55 
By 1992, through consensus, States had affirmed the need for an 
open, rule-based, non-discriminatory, equitable, secure and transparent 
multilateral trading system. They reaffirmed the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
principle that certain social and environmental standards may not be 
appropriate in all countries. But there is no indication that States intended 
for developing countries to bear significant risks from negative social and 
environmental impacts related to trade and investment liberalisation. 
Indeed, the opposite is constantly repeated. Global agendas called for the 
international economy to “provide a supportive international climate for 
achieving environment and development goals” through four principal 
sets of policies: (a) promoting sustainable development through trade; 
(b) making trade and environment mutually supportive; (c) providing 
adequate financial resources to developing countries; and (d) encouraging 
51. Hunter, Salzman & Zaelke, supra note 3 at 151; Sands, Principles of 
International Environmental Law, supra note 3 at 940. 
52. International co-operation to accelerate sustainable development in developing 
countries, poverty, consumption patterns, demographic dynamics, human 
health, human settlements, and integrating environment and development 
in decision-making.
53. Atmosphere, land resources, deforestation, desertification and drought, 
mountain ecosystems, sustainable agriculture and rural development, 
biological diversity, biotechnology, oceans and seas, fresh waters, toxic 
chemicals, hazardous wastes, solid and sewage wastes, and radioactive 
wastes.
54. Roles of women, children and youth, indigenous people, non-
governmental organisations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, 
business and industry, science and technology, and farmers.
55. Financing mechanisms, technology transfers, science, education, capacity 
building in developing countries, international institutional arrangements, 
international legal instruments, and information for decision-making.
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economic policies conducive to environment and development.56 
They highlighted the need for global efforts to build consensus on 
the intersections of environment, trade and development issues, both 
through existing international forums and in the domestic policy of each 
country.57 Indeed, UNCED led to the signing of three international 
treaties which each aimed to achieve sustainable development in different 
ways, with distinct linkages to international economic policy and law: 
the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change58 (“UNFCCC”), 
the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity59 (“UNCBD”) and the 
1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification60.
UNCED created a United Nations Commission for Sustainable 
56. Agenda 21, supra note 44 at paras 2.3, 2.43-2.5.
57. Ibid at para 2.4.
58. 4 June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994). See 
e.g. Climate and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World, UNEP (2000) at 22. 
See also Gary Sampson, “WTO Rules and Climate Change: The Need 
for Policy Coherence” in W Bradnee Chambers, ed, InterLinkages: The 
Kyoto Protocol and the International Trade and Investment Regimes, UNU 
Policy Perspectives No. 5 (2001) 75 where the author notes, infra, Kyoto 
Protocol provisions on measures to enhance energy efficiency, enhance 
sinks and reservoirs, increase use of new and renewable forms of energy, 
phase out fiscal incentives in GHG-emitting sectors, and promote the 
application of market instruments.
59. 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 art 143 (entered into force 29 December 
1993). See also e.g. Philippe G LePrestre, ed, Governing Global 
Biodiversity: The Evolution and Implementation of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (Burlington, Vermont: Routledge, 2002); Ian Walden, 
“Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity” in Catherine Redgwell 
& Michael Bowman, eds, International Law and the Conservation of 
Biological Diversity (London: Kluwer Law International, 1995) 171 at 
172, 178.
60. 14 October 1994, 1954 UNTS preamble and arts 1, 11, 14 (entered 
into force 26 December 1996); see also e.g. Karel Mayrand, “Integrated 
Assessment of Trade-Related Policies: Agricultural Trade Liberalisation 
and the Convention to Combat Desertification” (2006) 24:4 Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 311.
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Development61 (“UNCSD”), which served for two decades as a forum for 
consensus-building. In its discussions, the UNCSD expressed concerns 
about failure to adequately address economic and sustainable development 
links, including in the UNCSD Third Session,62 and UNCSD Eighth 
Session.63 In the 1997 United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on Sustainable Development (Earth Summit+5) (“UNGASS”) 
Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21,64 States laid 
out a further agenda for trade to support sustainable development, also 
highlighting the need to “further strengthen and codify international law 
related to sustainable development”.65 States agreed that: 
[i]n order to accelerate economic growth, poverty eradication and 
environmental protection, particularly in developing countries, there is 
a need to establish … instruments and structures enabling all countries, in 
particular developing countries, to benefit from globalization … There should 
be a balanced and integrated approach to trade and sustainable development, 
based on a combination of trade liberalization, economic development and 
environmental protection.66 
In the 1997 UNGASS Programme, both procedural and substantive 
guidance can be found for this “integrated approach”. States noted 
61. See Establishment of the Commission on Sustainable Development, 
UNESCOR, 1993, UN Doc E/1993/207; Institutional Arrangements to 
Follow Up the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
GA Res 191, UNGAOR, 47th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/47/191 (1993) at 
3-5; Michael McCoy & Patrick McCully, The Road from Rio: An NGO 
Action Guide to Environment and Development (Amsterdam: Utrecht 
International Books, 1993) at 45.
62. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Third Session, 
UNCSDOR, 1995, Supp No 12, UN Doc E/1995/32 at paras 
37-40, online: <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/
CN.17/1995/36&Lang=E>. 
63. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Eighth Session, 
UNCSDOR, 1999-2000, Supp No 9, UN Doc E/2000/29 at paras 
28-34, online: <www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/
CN.17/2000/20&Lang=E>.
64. UNGASS, Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21, supra 
note 30.
65. Ibid at paras 109-10.
66. Ibid at para 29.
174 
 
Cordonier Segger, Inspiration for Integration: Sustainable Development
that further liberalisation of trade should take effects on sustainable 
development into account, urging national governments to make 
every effort to ensure policy coordination on trade, environment and 
development in support of sustainable development. They identified the 
need for renewed system-wide efforts to ensure greater responsiveness 
to sustainable development objectives, recommending strengthened 
cooperation and support for capacity-building in trade, environment and 
development at both international and national levels, for international 
cooperation to ensure mutual supportiveness among economic and 
environmental agreements, and for trade liberalisation to be accompanied 
by new policies for more efficient allocation and use of resources.67 The 
GA also warned that “any future agreements on investments should 
take into account the objectives of sustainable development and, when 
developing countries are Parties to these agreements, special attention 
should be given to their needs for investment”.68 
Responses were uneven, however, and in a ten-year review at 
the 2002 WSSD,69 States re-focused on means to better implement 
sustainable development commitments. In the 2002 Johannesburg Plan 
of Implementation70 (“JPOI”), States established a broadened institutional 
architecture for sustainable development,71 to further implement 
Agenda 21 and the WSSD outcomes, and to meet emerging sustainable 
67. Ibid. 
68. Ibid at para 29(g).
69. Ten-year Review of Progress Achieved in the Implementation of the Outcome 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, GA 
Res 191, UNGAOR, 55th Sess, UN Doc A/RES/55/199 (2000) [UNGA, 
Ten-year Review].
70. Johannesburg Plan of Implementation, UNWSSD, 2002, UN Doc A/
CONF.199/20 7 [JPOI].
71. UNGA, Ten-year Review, supra note 69; Report of the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development, UNWSSD, 2002, UN Doc A/CONF.199/20 
at paras 140-70 [Report of the WSSD]; Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & 
Maria Ivanova, “Sustainable Development Governance: Take Two” (2003) 
Concept Paper for South African Chair of UNCSD (on file with author). 
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development challenges.72 In JPOI Chapter XI, economic institutions 
such as the WTO and regional trade bodies were tasked to enhance 
their work to realise sustainable development objectives.73 Rather than 
repeating the UNCED and UNGASS texts, the guidance on trade and 
sustainable development is brief, with a change in tone that strongly 
focuses the agenda on the social development dimensions of trade and 
investment policy. States noted that “[g]lobalization offers opportunities 
and challenges for sustainable development”74 and emphasised the special 
difficulties faced by developing countries, calling for globalisation to 
become fully inclusive and equitable. In addition to calls for WTO trade 
negotiations to take development concerns into account, the need to 
strengthen “regional trade and cooperation agreements... with a view to 
achieving the objectives of sustainable development” was highlighted.75 
At X, as a means of implementing sustainable development, an agenda 
for integrating social development and environmental priorities into 
global and regional trade negotiations was set forth.76 States, inter alia, 
called for “efforts to promote cooperation on trade, environment and 
development”; “the voluntary use of environmental impact assessments 
as an important national-level tool to better identify trade, environment 
and development inter-linkages …”; and “further action ... to enhance the 
benefits, in particular for developing countries ... of trade liberalization” 
and to “establish and strengthen existing trade and cooperation agreements 
... with a view to achieving sustainable development”.77 While WSSD 
outcomes may be hortatory, this clear consensus was made available to 
guide and influence future treaty-making. 
This approach was emphasized in the 2015 Declaration Transforming 
72. Report of the Secretary General, Follow-up to Johannesburg and the Future 
Role of the CSD – The Implementation Track, UNESCOR, 2003, UN Doc 
E/CN.17/2003/2.
73. JPOI, supra note 70 at paras 47-48, 51, 151, 154-55, 158-61.
74. Ibid at paras 47-52.
75. Ibid paras 90-100.
76. Ibid at paras 81-136.
77. Ibid at paras 90-100.
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Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.78 At paragraph 
2, States committed by consensus to achieve “sustainable development 
in its three dimensions – economic, social and environmental – in 
a balanced and integrated manner” and at paragraph 3, they resolved 
to create conditions for sustainable, inclusive and sustained economic 
growth. At paragraph 18, States reaffirmed their commitment to 
international law, and at paragraph 30 urged each other to refrain from 
“any unilateral economic, financial or trade measures not in accordance 
with international law ... that impede the full achievement of economic 
and social development” particularly for developing countries. Annexed, 
in the SDGs, trade and investment were characterised as a means of 
implementation for sustainable development. SDG 8 commits to 
“promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all”, including by, inter 
alia, increasing aid for trade support. SDG 9 commits to “build resilient 
infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and 
foster innovation”. At SDG 17.5, States agreed to “adopt and implement 
investment promotion regimes for least developed countries” and at 
SDG 17.11 they called to significantly increase the exports of developing 
countries. At the same time, at SDG 10.a, States also committed 
to “implement the principle of special and differential treatment 
for developing countries, in particular least developed countries, in 
accordance with [WTO] agreements”. The trade and investment being 
promoted is expected to be coherent, integrated, pro-poor – sustainable. 
For instance, at SDG 17.13-14, States highlighted the need to enhance 
global macroeconomic stability through policy coordination and 
policy coherence for sustainable development, while at SDG 17.15 
they agreed to respect “each country’s policy space and leadership to 
establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable 
development”. Indeed, at paragraph 68, States explicitly underscore that 
“international trade is an engine for inclusive economic growth and 
poverty reduction”, but one which “contributes to the promotion of 
78. Transforming our World, supra note 10.
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sustainable development”.79
In all, there is scant indication from the global consensus statements 
of the 1972 UNCHE, the 1992 UNCED, the UNCSD deliberations, 
the 1997 UNGASS, the 2002 WSSD, the 2012 UNCSD, or the 2015 
SDGs, that the risks and burdens of trade-led economic growth should 
be left to fall upon the most vulnerable in developing country trading 
partners, or that social and environmental decision-making should be 
kept separate from trade law. Indeed, the opposite is prioritised, though 
much remains to be done. 
The 1992 Rio Declaration and other documents are not hard, binding 
international law: indeed, they are often cited as the quintessential 
examples of soft law.80 However, soft law can be relevant to the future 
development of international law, in a more nuanced manner than the 
hard law found in treaties, established customary rules, or other formal 
sources recognised in Article 38 of the 1946 Statute of the International 
Court of Justice.81 Soft law norms and standards can evolve into binding 
obligations upon States through subsequent negotiation of international 
treaties or eventual recognition as international customary rules.82 In 
an inter-actional manner, the initial phases of development of new 
international treaty regimes, including recognition of relevant legal 
principles, can be shaped by the inter-State debates and consensus 
79. Ibid.
80. See supra note 33 for the nuances of soft law. 
81. SICJ, supra note 33, art 38.
82. See Alan Boyle, “Soft Law in International Law-Making” in Malcom D 
Evans, ed, International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 122 
at 141-58 which suggests the 1992 Rio Declaration is an instrument which 
both codifies existing international law and seeks to develop new law at 
145; Simpson, supra note 33; Weiler & Paulus, supra note 33; Fastenrath, 
supra note 33. For earlier discussions, see Grnchalla-Wesierski, supra note 
33 and Jonathan Charney, “Compliance with International Soft Law” in 
Dinah Shelton, ed, Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 115 at 115-18.
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building that characterises these processes.83 Indeed, taking into account 
the doctrine of good faith in international law, very widely-supported 
soft law may generate legitimate expectations among other States.84 Such 
expectations may not be decisive, as they can be rebutted, for instance 
through explicit statements that a particular ‘soft law’ standard, principle 
or policy consensus is not applicable in the circumstances,85 but in this 
case the preponderance of unanimous guidance is convincing. Certain 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to State intentions for the trade 
and sustainable development relationship.
First, economic policies and agreements are not intended to constrain 
the adoption and enforcement of legitimate new environment and social 
development measures, nor to make it more inherently difficult to 
implement specific obligations from international treaties. Rather, the 
consensus declarations and instruments on these topics are replete with 
calls for trade policies to mutually support environment and development 
priorities in a balanced and integrated way for sustainable development,86 
83. Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 5-9 [Brunnée & 
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law].
84. Philip Allott, “The Concept of International Law” (1999) 10:1 European 
Journal of International Law 31; Nico Krisch, “International Law in 
Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International 
Legal Order” (2005) 16:3 European Journal of International Law 369; 
Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law” (1990) 1 
European Journal of International Law 4; Nico Krisch, “The Pluralism 
of Global Administrative Law” (2006) 17:1 European Journal of 
International Law 247. 
85. Charney, supra note 82 at 115-18. But see Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “Soft 
Law and the International Law of the Environment” (1991) 12 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 420 at 428 and Christine Chinkin, “The 
Challenge of Soft Law” (1989) 38:4 The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 850 at 859. 
86. UNGASS, Programme for the Further Implementation, supra note 30, 
in which States agreed at para 29 that “[t]here should be a balanced 
and integrated approach to trade and sustainable development, based 
on a combination of trade liberalization, economic development and 
environmental protection”.
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to strengthen sustainable natural resources management,87 to strengthen 
and encourage environmental regulations and standards,88 and to support 
poverty eradication, including through the realisation of human rights.89
Second, trade and investment policies and agreements are not 
expected to create incentives for trade-led economic growth that will 
add to serious environmental and social problems which already exist at 
domestic levels, and curtail the enforcement of laws intended to support 
sustainable development, especially in developing countries. Rather, 
the detailed action plans and other “soft law” instruments on these 
topics emphasise and re-emphasise an urgent need for accompanying 
cooperative measures to increase social and environmental regulatory 
capacity and provide technical assistance,90 and for cooperative measures 
to generate new and additional financial, human and other resources to 
address environmental or developmental challenges associated with trade 
87. Ibid, “[t]rade liberalization should be accompanied by environmental 
and resource management policies in order to realize its full potential 
contribution to improve environmental protection and the promotion of 
sustainable development through the more efficient allocation and use of 
resources”.
88. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report on the Fourth Session, 
UNCSDOR, Supp No 8, UN Doc E/1996/28 (1996) (“[s]tresses that 
it would be inappropriate to relax environmental laws, regulations and 
standards or their enforcement in order to encourage foreign direct 
investment or to promote exports” Decision 4/1, 4(c)) [UNCSD, Fourth 
Session Report].
89. JPOI, supra note 70 at paras 7-13.
90. UNCSD, Fourth Session Report, supra note 88 “[r]ecognizes that positive 
measures, such as improved market access, capacity-building, improved 
access to finance, and access to and transfer of technology, taking 
into account the relationship between trade-related agreements and 
technology, are effective instruments for assisting developing countries 
in meeting multilaterally agreed targets in keeping with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities” Decision 4/1, 3(b).
180 
 
Cordonier Segger, Inspiration for Integration: Sustainable Development
and investment treaties.91 
Third, and perhaps most challenging, trade and investment policies 
and treaties need not serve to encourage unsustainable growth in obsolete 
technologies, goods or economic sectors, or to stimulate, through 
pollution havens, subsidies and other means, the growth of these sectors. 
Soft law declarations continue to firmly call for the phase-out of such 
measures.92 States have not committed to support the imposition of 
social or environmental standards that are not appropriate for developing 
countries. However, in internationally negotiated treaties, resolutions, 
standards and guidelines, States are calling for measures to encourage 
increased trade and investment in more sustainable low-carbon 
technologies,93 the sustainable use of genetic resources,94 more sustainably 
91. UNGASS, Programme for Further Implementation, supra note 30 notes 
“[t]he multilateral trading system should have the capacity to further 
integrate environmental considerations and enhance its contribution 
to sustainable development, without undermining its open, equitable 
and non-discriminatory character. The special and differential treatment 
for developing countries, especially the least developed countries, and 
the other commitments of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations 18 should be fully implemented in order to enable those 
countries to benefit from the international trading system, while 
conserving the environment” at para 29.
92. The Future We Want, supra note 10 reaffirms calls for phase out of subsidies 
that impede the transition to sustainable development, including those on 
fossil fuels, unsustainable agriculture and fisheries, at para 126.
93. Report of the WSSD, supra note 71 at paras 20, 59; Commission on 
Sustainable Development, Report on the Seventeenth Session Session, 
UNCSDOR, 2009, UN Doc E/2009/29, s 12(g)(i); Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, UNFCCC, 2002, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1.
94. Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity at its Tenth Meeting (Nagoya, Japan, 18-29 October 
2010) Decision X/1; UNEP & IISD, Environment and Trade, supra note 
38 at 55-56; Mary Seely et al, “Creative Problem Solving in Support of 
Biodiversity Conservation” (2003) 54:1 Journal of Arid Environments 
155. 
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produced or harvested goods,95 environmental goods and services, 96 and 
pesticide-free products. 97
In summary, there is a convincing international policy rationale 
for States to undertake measures to prevent, or at least mitigate, the 
environment and social development impacts of trade and investment 
agreements, addressing the main tensions identified between trade 
and sustainability. States have repeatedly committed, in consensus 
declarations of principles,98 detailed action plans,99 UN conference 
debates,100 solemn resolutions,101 and international guidelines and 
95. UNGASS, Programme for Further Implementation, supra note 30 in 
which States find, “[t]rade obstacles should be removed with a view to 
contributing to the achieving of more efficient use of the earth’s natural 
resources in both economic and environmental terms” at para 29.
96. OECD, Public Affairs Division, Public Affairs and Communications 
Directorate, Opening Markets for Environmental Goods and Services, 
Policy Brief (2005), online: <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/15/35415839.
pdf>; WTO, Ministerial Declaration (20 November 2001, Doha, Qatar), 
WTO Doc WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 at paras 31-33, online: <www.wto.
org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm>; Zhong Xiang 
Zhang, “Liberalizing Climate-Friendly Goods and Technologies in the 
WTO: Product Coverage, Modalities, Challenges and the Way Forward” 
(2009) 1 UNCTAD Trade and Environment Review 1.
97. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain 
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, 10 September 
1998, 2244 UNTS 337 preamble (entered into force 4 February 2004); 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 22 May 2001, 2256 
UNTS 119 preamble (entered into force 17 May 2004); Gavin Fridell, 
“Free Trade, Fair Trade and the State” (2010) 15:3 New Political Economy 
457 at 457-58. 
98. See e.g. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
UNGAOR, 2007, UN Doc Res 69-295; Report of the Secretary-General 
on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development, UNCSD, 1996, UN 
Doc E/CN.17/1996/8.
99. Agenda 21, supra note 44; Report of the WSSD, supra note 71.
100. See e.g. IISD Reporting Services, “Summary of the First Prepcom for the 
UN Conference on Sustainable Development” (21 May 2010) Winnipeg: 
IISD, 2010.
101. UNGASS, Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21, supra note 
30.
182 
 
Cordonier Segger, Inspiration for Integration: Sustainable Development
standards,102 to make increased efforts to ensure that trade can support 
sustainable development, especially in developing countries. It can be 
argued that States are justified in forming legitimate expectations about 
sustainable development in trade negotiations.103 In this context, it is 
not credible to maintain that negative social and environmental effects 
of economic agreements should be simply left to roll downhill onto the 
weakest Parties. Rather, it can be suggested, States agree in practice that 
where possible in economic agreements, measures can and should be 
taken. Absent explicit instructions to the contrary, both developed and 
developing country Parties to such negotiations should be able to rely on 
these expectations.
II. International Legal Reasons for Countries to 
Address Environmental and Social Impacts of 
Trade and Investment Agreements
There are important international policy and soft law reasons that the 
impacts of trade and investment liberalisation should not simply be 
left to “fall where they may” onto the fragile ecosystems and vulnerable 
populations of developing country trading partners. Are there also 
international hard law considerations? 
States could also be legally bound to address the sustainability impacts 
of economic liberalisation – not just to prevent harm, but to actually 
integrate environmental and social development considerations in order 
to strengthen and enhance the contribution of trade to sustainable 
development. To determine whether it is the case, an examination of 
customary and interstitial norms can be carried out. Noting the relevance 
of pacta sunct servanda, it remains to be considered whether international 
law requires States to integrate significant environmental and social 
considerations into economic development plans, including into the 
negotiations of new trade and investment agreements. 
102. See e.g. EC, Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines (Brussels: EC, 
2005).
103. Phillip Allot, The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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A. Sustainable Development as an Interstitial Norm
Beyond soft law policy rationales, are there any legal obligations for States 
to promote sustainable development through trade and investment? 
The legal status of State commitments to sustainable development has 
been debated in academic literature for two decades.104 Certain States, 
scholars and NGOs argued that the obligation to develop sustainably is 
a new customary principle of international law, binding upon all but a 
few persistently objecting States.105 However, as Gunter Handl argued in 
1990, “[n]ormative uncertainty, coupled with the absence of justiciable 
standards for review, strongly suggest that there is as yet no international 
legal obligation that development must be sustainable”,106 and that as such 
“decisions on what constitutes sustainability rest primarily with individual 
104. See updated legal scholarship in Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 
3 at 116-18. See also Philippe Sands, “International Law in the Field of 
Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles” in Wilfred Lang, 
ed, Sustainable Development and International Law (London: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1995); Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters & Paul JIM De Waart, eds, 
Sustainable Development and Good Governance (Boston: Dordrecht Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1995); “Sustainable Development: The Challenge 
to International Law: Report of a Consultation held at Windsor 27 
to 29 April 1993” (1993) 2:4 Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law 1; Phillipe Sands, “International Law 
in the Field of Sustainable Development” (1994) 65:1 British Yearbook of 
International Law 1 at 303. 
105. Hunter, Zaelke and Salzman, supra note 3 at 210; Kiss & Shelton, supra 
note 3 at 51; Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra 
note 3 at 231; Lang, ibid; Atapattu, supra note 3; Bugge, supra note 24 
at 20. But see Boyle & Freestone, supra note 11 at 6 and Birnie, Boyle & 
Redgwell, ibid at 116-18, 126-27. 
106. See Günther Handl, “Environmental Security and Global Change: The 
Challenge to International Law” (1990) 1:1 Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 3 (rejects the possibility that sustainable development 
is a peremptory norm of international law); see also Günther Handl, “The 
Legal Mandate of Multilateral Development Banks as Agents for Change 
towards Sustainable Development” (1998) 92:4 American Journal of 
International Law 642.
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governments”.107 As Vaughan Lowe notes wryly, “the argument that 
sustainable development is a norm of customary international law, 
binding on and directing the conduct of states, and which can be applied 
by tribunals, is not sustainable”.108 It is not novel to conclude that States 
have not yet accepted a customary legal obligation to always develop 
sustainably.109 Indeed, a search for one agreed customary norm that 
development must be sustainable might actually steer one in the wrong 
direction. 
As observed by the revered late Judge Weeramantry in his extraordinary 
Separate Opinion in the Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v Slovakia)110 (“Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case”), there is 
“wide and general acceptance by the global community”111 of sustainable 
development. The concept has become legally relevant, informing 
tribunals and treaties, particularly in its procedural dimensions.112 As 
Lowe has further argued, State commitments to sustainable development 
might engage a certain interstitial normativity, acting “upon other legal 
107. Boyle & Freestone, supra note 11 at 16. 
108. Vaughan Lowe, “Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments” 
in Alan Boyle & David Freestone, eds, International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 19 at 30 [Lowe, “Sustainable Development”].
109. See Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3 at 125-27 and Marie-Claire 
Cordonier Segger, “Sustainable Development in International Law” in 
David Armstrong, ed, Routledge Handbook of International Law (New 
York: Routledge, 2009) 355 at 359-71.
110. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, [1997] ICJ Rep 7 
[Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case].
111. Ibid at 95.
112. Esther Kentin, “Sustainable Development in International Investment 
Dispute Settlement: The ICSID and NAFTA Experience” in Nico 
Schrijver & Friedll Weiss, eds, International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Principles and Practice (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 309; Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
“Sustainability, Global Justice, and the Law: Contributions of the Hon. 
Justice Charles Doherty Gonthier” (2010) 55:2 McGill Law Journal 337. 
See also Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger & Judge CG Weeramantry, eds, 
Sustainable Development in International Courts and Tribunals (New York: 
Routledge, 2017).
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rules and principles – a legal concept exercising a kind of interstitial 
normativity, pushing and pulling the boundaries of true primary norms 
when they threaten to overlap or conflict with each other”.113 There is: 
an immense gravitational pull exerted by concepts such as sustainable 
development, regardless of their standing as rules or principles of lex lata. That 
is plain when they are used by judges as modifiers; but it is also true when they 
are used in the same way by states as they negotiate (either with other states, or 
within their own governmental apparatus) on ways of reconciling conflicting 
principles.114 
As an interstitial norm which can play a role in importing a “group 
of congruent norms”,115 the broadly held commitment to promote 
sustainable development may push or pull States to use and apply certain 
international practices and even other emerging customary principles, to 
guide the future development and implementation of treaty regimes. From 
an inter-actional perspective, sustainable development commitments 
can be argued to be shaping the initial phases of development of new 
international treaty regimes, including relevant legal principles.116 Taking 
this inter-actional account seriously, global commitments to sustainable 
development can engender further normative consequences for States’ 
economic development planning, including in their negotiations of 
trade and investment agreements. Such further principles for sustainable 
development may become recognised as customary rules, binding on all 
113. Lowe, “Sustainable Development”, supra note 108 at 31; Vaughan 
Lowe, “The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of 
Norm Creation Changing?” in Michael Byers, ed, The Role of Law in 
International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 207 at 214-15. 
114. Lowe, “Sustainable Development”, ibid at 35.
115. Ibid at 26.
116. Brunnée & Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra 
note 83.
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States that have not persistently objected.117 From this perspective, it is 
important to consider which, of such principles, could be most relevant 
to economic treaty negotiation and interpretation.
B. Integration as an International Customary Norm of 
Relevance to Trade and Sustainable Development
The process of crystallising principles of international law related to 
sustainable development has been complex, and is not yet complete. The 
most important undertakings emerged from the global debates. In the 
1987 Annex on Legal Principles to the Brundtland Report, the WCED 
called for the international adoption of legal principles to promote 
sustainable development. The Commission provided a considered legal 
analysis, commentary and clear normative proposals for a series of 22 legal 
principles.118 In Article 7, the experts recommended recognition of the 
principle that the conservation of natural resources and the environment 
shall be treated as an integral part of the planning and implementation of 
development activities.119 The 1992 Rio Declaration echoed many of the 
Principles recommended by the Brundtland Report, and was followed by 
the Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Identification of Principles 
of International Law for Sustainable Development, commissioned by the 
United Nations Division for Sustainable Development in accordance 
with a request of States at the UCSD Second Session in 1994.120 This 
Report identified 19 principles and concepts of international law for 
117. Cordonier Segger & Khalfan, supra note 12 at 47-50 (wide-spread 
adoption of such principles in the 1992 Rio Treaties, might even support 
a contention that certain principles are already gaining this level of 
recognition. The practical implications of such recognitions, given that 
the nearly universal membership of these treaties, might be minimal. But 
it does not discount the value of examining these principles themselves, 
particularly if they could also be relevant to trade law and policy).
118. WCED, Our Common Future, supra note 27 at 65.
119. Ibid.
120. Commission on Sustainable Development, Report of the Expert Group 
Meeting on Identification of Principles of International Law for Sustainable 
Development, UNCSD, 4th Sess (1996) online: <www.un.org/documents/
ecosoc/cn17/1996/background/ecn171996-bp3.htm>).
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sustainable development in the context of international legal instruments 
of that time, though it was not exhaustive. In 1997, in light of the 
recommendations of the Report, States noted in the Programme for 
Further Implementation of Agenda 21121 that: “[w]hile some progress has 
been made in implementing United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development commitments through a variety of international legal 
instruments, much remains to be done to embody the Rio principles 
more firmly in law and practice”.122
Building on these processes, in 2002 at its 70th Conference in New 
Delhi,123 the International Law Association’s Committee on the Legal 
Aspects of Sustainable Development released a Declaration of Principles 
of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development124 (“New Delhi 
Declaration”). As noted in the Declaration, it was found that “sustainable 
development is now widely accepted as a global objective and that the 
concept has been amply recognised in various international and national 
legal instruments, including treaty law and jurisprudence at international 
and national levels …”125 and that seven principles of international 
121. UNGASS, Programme for Further Implementation, supra note 30.
122. Ibid at para 14 (the General Assembly also noted that “[p]rogress has been 
made in incorporating the principles contained in the Rio Declaration 
on Environment and Development – including the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities, which embodies the important concept 
of and basis for international partnership; the precautionary principle; 
the polluter pays principle; and the environmental impact assessment 
principle – in a variety of international and national legal instruments”, 
ibid).
123. (2-6 April 2002), New Delhi, India.
124. International Law Association, “Declaration of Principles of 
International Law Relating to Sustainable Development” in International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2 (Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002) [New Delhi Declaration]; 
International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Second Conference 
(Seoul: International Law Association, 1987) 1-11, 409-87; Nico 
Schrijver & Friedll Weiss, “Editorial Introduction” (2002) 2 International 
Environmental Agreements 105.
125. New Delhi Declaration, ibid at 211.
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law on sustainable development could be outlined.126 Analysis of each 
principle in the New Delhi Declaration, documenting both relevance and 
doubts as to international legal status, is available elsewhere.127 However, 
among these seven principles identified in the New Delhi Declaration 
reappeared a duty to integrate environmental and social considerations 
into economic decision-making.128 This built on Principle 4 of the 
Rio Declaration, which stated that: “[i]n order to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part 
of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from 
it”.129 
If one customary international rule named a “sustainable development 
principle” were to be recognised, given its first six words Principle 4 of the 
Rio Declaration seems a likely candidate. However, as found in the New 
Delhi Declaration, this norm could also simply called the “integration 
principle”. The New Delhi Declaration emphasises recent developments 
in soft law, such as the need to recognise the social and human rights 
pillar of sustainable development, essentially advocating an integration 
principle which requires States to take social and human rights, as well 
126. Ibid at 213-16.
127. Ibid at 1-152, 699-706; Duncan French, “Treaty Interpretation and the 
Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules” (2006) 55:2 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 281; see also Cordonier Segger & Khalfan, 
supra note 12 at 95-191; Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, “International 
Law on Sustainable Development” in Hans Christian Bugge & Christina 
Voigt, eds, Sustainable Development in International and National Law 
(Groningen: Europa Law Publishing, 2009) 87; Marie-Claire Cordonier 
Segger, “Sustainable Development in International Law” in David 
Armstrong, ed, Routledge Handbook of International Law (London: 
Routledge, 2009). See also publications on <www.cisdl.org> for notes 
on how each principle has been reflected in international treaty law on 
sustainable development over several decades. 
128. Ibid.
129. Rio Declaration, supra note 28, Principle 4.
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as environmental protection, into account in the development process.130 
Such an integration principle could be considered an emerging customary 
norm.
As noted in the 1903 Gentini Case (Italy v Venezuela),131 a principle 
“expresses a general truth, which guides our action, serves as a theoretical 
basis for the various acts of our life, and the application of which to 
reality produces a given consequence”.132 As argued by Professor Martii 
Koskenniemi more recently, when “States enter an agreement, or when 
some behaviour is understood to turn from habit into custom, the 
assumption is that something that was loose and disputed crystallises 
into something that is fixed and no longer negotiable”.133 Customary 
principles, if recognised, can establish obligations for all States except 
those which have persistently objected to a practice and its legal 
consequences.134
According to Article 38(1)(b) of the SICJ: “[t]he Court, whose 
130. Ibid at 102-09. See Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, 
1760 UNTS 79 art 6 (entered into force 29 December 1993); Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 29 January 
2000, 2226 UNTS 208 preamble and art 2.4-2.5 (entered into force 
11 September 2003); International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture, 3 November 2001, 33 ILM 81 preamble and art 
5.1 (entered into force 29 June 2004) [FAO Seed Treaty]. See also North 
American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can TS 1994 No 
2 arts 103-104.1, 1114, 2101 (entered into force 1 January 1994). See 
also Sebastien Jodoin, The Principle of Integration and Interrelationship in 
International Sustainable Development Law, in A Usha, ed, Environmental 
Law: Principles and Governance (Hyderabad, India: ICFAI University 
Press, 2008) at 83-121.
131. (1903), 10 RIAA 551 (Mixed Claims Commission).
132. Ibid at 556 as cited in Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) at 24 and in Sands, Principles of International Environmental 
Law, supra note 3 at 233.
133. Martti Koskenniemi, “What is International Law For?” in Malcolm 
Evans, ed, International Law, 4d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
at 69.
134. Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 6d (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at 68-88.
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function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes 
as are submitted to it, shall apply ... international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law”.135 These rules of international 
custom can be derived from the consistent conduct of States acting in 
the belief that international law requires them to so act, and jurists, to 
prove an international customary principle, must show State practice by 
demonstrating the widespread repetition by States of similar international 
acts over time.136 Such acts must be taken by a significant number of States, 
and not be rejected by too many others with an interest in the matter.137 
The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) has stated that “it might 
be that, even without the passage of any considerable period of time, 
a very widespread and representative participation in the convention 
might suffice of itself, provided it included that of States whose interest 
were specifically affected”.138 The bar to rapidly transform a broadly 
practiced principle into one accepted as customary law, as set by the ICJ 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany 
v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands)139 (“North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases”), is relatively high: 
an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in question, 
short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests 
are specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in 
135. SICJ, supra note 33, art 38(1)(b); Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 
1945, Can TS 1945 No 7 (entered into force 24 October 1945); see also 
Shaw, supra note 134.
136. Hugh Thirlway, The Sources of International Law in Malcolm Evans, ed, 
International Law, 4d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 95 at 121-
27.
137. Anthony D’Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1971); Michael Akehurst, “Custom as a Source 
of International Law” (1976) 47:1 British Yearbook of International 
Law 1 at 1-53; Maurice Mendelson, “The Formation of Customary 
International Law” (1999) 272 Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit 
International 9 at 155.
138. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) (Judgement) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 
at para 73 [North Sea Continental Shelf Cases].
139. Ibid.
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the sense of the provision invoked; — and should moreover have occurred in 
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation 
is involved.140
The ICJ has also found that it is sufficient that the conduct of States 
should, in general, be consistent with a customary principle, and that 
instances of inconsistent conduct have been generally treated as breaches 
of the rule rather than indications of a new rule having emerged.141 If a 
norm has been accepted as a principle of customary international law, the 
international acts that follow the rule should occur out of sense of legal 
obligation. As noted by the ICJ, in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
“[t]he need for such a belief, i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is 
implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitates”.142 Further, 
if a norm that is enshrined in a treaty is still followed in the practices of 
non-Parties, it can, provided that there is opinio juris, lead to the evolution 
of a customary rule which will be applicable between states that are not 
Party to the treaty and between Parties and non-Parties, even before the 
treaty has entered into force.143 However, as was demonstrated in the 
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway)144 at the ICJ, a State can avoid 
being bound by a customary rule if it persistently objects to that rule.145 
Before a discussion of general State practice and opinio juris, a 
further potential “precondition” should also be addressed. To prove the 
existence of a norm of customary law, there is a need to show that State 
practice and opinio juris has been extensive and virtually uniform in the 
sense of the provision invoked. This element relates to the requirement 
that a principle have the “fundamentally norm-creating character such 
as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule”.146 Several 
140. Ibid at para 74.
141. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Judgement) General 
List No 70, [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at para 186.
142. Shaw, supra note 134 at 44.
143. Hugh Thirlway, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice” (1990) 60:1 British Yearbook of International Law 4 at 87.
144. [1951] ICJ Rep 116 [Fisheries Case].
145. Ibid at 138-39.
146. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, supra note 138 at para 63.
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legal scholars have been critical of whether such a precondition is needed 
at all in the context of treaties and custom.147 However as others such as 
Hans Kelsen have noted, an international legal norm, whether derived 
from an international treaty or international customary law, should be 
understood in reference to its function.148 In international law, as Kelsen 
explains, most norms have one of four functions. Either they impose 
an obligation on States to do something, as a command (prescriptive 
norms); or they impose an obligation on States not to do something, 
as a prohibition (prohibitive norms).149 They can also grant a right to a 
State not to do something, as an exemption (exempting norms), or grant 
a right to a state to do something, as a form of permission (permissive 
norms).150 
Indeed, if “integration” were proposed as a principle of customary 
law, there would need to be some clarity as to what the commitment 
actually prescribes, prohibits, exempts or permits States to do. Like a 
prohibition against armed attack, or a permission of each State to control 
an exclusive economic zone 200 miles from their coast, a commitment to 
integrate would normatively require or permit States to take (or not take) 
certain actions. A customary principle should be specific – or at least 
normative enough to form the basis of a claim against a State.151
Could a requirement to “integrate social and environmental 
considerations into economic decision-making” be emerging as a 
customary rule? Certain guidance can be found in the decision of the ICJ 
147. See Richard Baxter, “Treaties and Custom” (1970) 129 Recueil des 
Cours 44 (Professor Baxter argues that the notion of norm-creating rules 
was redundant: “if a rule does pass into international law, it is norm-
creating…” at 62). See also Mark Villiger, Customary International Law 
and Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) at 190-202. But see Robert 
Jennings, “What is International Law and How Do We Tell It When We 
See It?” (1981) 37 Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 59 
at 59-88.
148. Hans Kelsen, Theorie Generale des Normes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1996) at 1.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
151. Lowe, “Sustainable Development”, supra note 108.
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in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case. In that case, faced with the question as 
to whether one Party could compel another to continue building a dam 
in accordance with a treaty, in spite of concerns about the impacts of the 
project, the majority stated that: 
throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly 
interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration 
of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a 
growing awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations 
– of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new 
norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of 
instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into 
consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when 
States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities 
begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic development with protection of 
the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development. 
For the purposes of the present case, this means that the Parties together should 
look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabcíkovo 
power plant. In particular they must find a satisfactory solution for the volume 
of water to be released into the old bed of the Danube and into the side-arms 
on both sides of the river.152 
Perhaps only procedural requirements were imposed on the Parties, 
where they are required to “look afresh” at the effects.153 Indeed, it has 
been argued that the word “concept” was carefully chosen by the majority 
to defer recognition of custom.154 However, it can also be proposed that 
the Court ordered the Parties to integrate environmental protection into 
their development project by requiring them, after their assessment, to 
also “find a satisfactory solution”. From this view, the Court applied a 
nascent principle of integration, a requirement to reconcile economic 
development with the protection of the environment, in order to achieve 
an objective of sustainable development. 
Review of the 2005 award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Arbitration 
Regarding the Iron Rhine (Ijzeren Rijn) Railway (Kingdom of Belgium v 
152. Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, supra note 110 at paras 140-41 [emphasis 
added].
153. Philippe Sands, “International Courts and the Concept of Sustainable 
Development” (1999) 3 United Nations Year Book 390 at 391-94.
154. Lowe, “Sustainable Development”, supra note 108.
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Kingdom of the Netherlands)155 (“Iron Rhine”) struck under the auspices 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration lends support to this view. The 
Tribunal found that there is “considerable debate as to what … constitutes 
“rules” or “principles”; what is “soft law”; and which environmental 
treaty law or principles have contributed to the development of 
customary international law”.156 It further states that: “… [t]he emerging 
principles, whatever their current status, make reference to conservation, 
management, notions of prevention and of sustainable development, and 
protection for future generations...”.157 As the Tribunal then explains:
[t]oday, both international and EC law require the integration of appropriate 
environmental measures in the design and implementation of economic 
development activities. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development, adopted in 1992 which reflects this trend, provides that 
‘environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.’ Importantly, these emerging 
principles now integrate environmental protection into the development process. 
Environmental law and the law on development stand not as alternatives but as 
mutually reinforcing, integral concepts, which require that where development 
may cause significant harm to the environment there is a duty to prevent, or at 
least mitigate, such harm …. This duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now 
become a principle of general international law.158
It may be that the Court only meant that the “duty to prevent ... 
such harm” is an accepted principle. But it can be equally argued that 
an emerging principle to integrate environmental protection into the 
development process was further recognised by the Court. As explained: 
“[t]his principle applies not only in autonomous activities but also in 
activities undertaken in implementation of specific treaties between the 
Parties”.159 And as further noted: “[t]he reactivation of the Iron Rhine 
railway cannot be viewed in isolation from the environmental protection 
measures necessitated by the intended use of the railway line. These 
measures are to be fully integrated into the project and its costs”.160 
155. Iron Rhine, supra note 9.
156. Ibid at paras 58-59.
157. Ibid.
158. Ibid at para 59 [emphasis added].
159. Ibid.
160. Ibid at para 223 [emphasis added].
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This suggests that the “duty to integrate appropriate environmental 
measures in the design and implementation of economic development 
activities”, as recognised by the Tribunal, could be recognised as a 
principle of customary law. Such a duty is normative. It is both corollary 
and an extension of the established duty that “where development may 
cause significant harm to the environment, there is a duty to prevent, or 
at least mitigate, such harm”.161 This customary principle of integration, 
as highlighted in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration at Principles 12 and 
13, analysed in the 1987 Brundtland Report’s Legal Experts Group 
Recommendations at Article 7 on planning and implementation of 
development activities,162 and further recognised in Principle 4 of the Rio 
Declaration, can be characterised as lex ferenda, an emerging customary 
norm. 
For economic treaties, the principle is relevant to cases where the 
economic development activities involve measures to stimulate increases 
in trade and investment flows, particularly State initiatives undertaken 
in implementation of specific trade and investment treaties. While the 
international application of a customary principle may suggest that the 
rule is only relevant in a transboundary context, it is becoming rapidly 
recognised that ecological systems themselves are globally and regionally 
inter-related in complex ways that science and technology have only 
begun to discover.163 Many environmental challenges have transboundary 
scope, from biodiversity and migratory species at risk, to transboundary 
watercourses, to oceans, to climate change and the global atmosphere. 
The integration principle also has limits: “constituting an integral 
part” is not the same as “becoming a trump card”. Indeed, another ICJ 
case suggests outer boundaries for application of the emerging norm, also 
linked directly to sustainable development. Positive claims based on a 
State’s “sovereign right to implement sustainable economic development 
161. Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3 at 137-52; Sands, Principles of 
International Environmental Law, supra note 3 at 241-46, 117.
162. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34 at 12-13; WCED, Our Common 
Future, supra note 27 at 65.
163. Pushpam Kumar, ed, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity: 
Ecological and Economic Foundations (London: Routledge, 2012).
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projects”164 were used by States in the 2006 Case concerning Pulp Mills 
on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay).165 The ICJ notes that in 
pleadings on Provisional Measures in this case, Uruguay maintained 
that “the provisional measures sought by Argentina would ... therefore 
irreparably prejudice Uruguay’s sovereign right to implement sustainable 
economic development projects in its own territory”.166 Concern for this 
right appears in the ICJ’s reasoning in its initial Order with Regards to 
Provisional Measures, where the Court found that:
the present case highlights the importance of the need to ensure environmental 
protection of shared natural resources while allowing for sustainable economic 
development … it is in particular necessary to bear in mind the reliance of the 
Parties on the quality of the water of the River Uruguay for their livelihood and 
economic development … from this point of view account must be taken of 
the need to safeguard the continued conservation of the river environment and the 
rights of economic development of the riparian States;167 
In the ICJ’s final Judgement for this case, this perspective is reinforced:
… regarding Article 27, it is the view of the Court that its formulation 
reflects not only the need to reconcile the varied interests of riparian States 
in a transboundary context and in particular in the use of a shared natural 
resource, but also the need to strike a balance between the use of the waters and 
the protection of the river consistent with the objective of sustainable development  
… The Court wishes to add that such utilization could not be considered to be 
equitable and reasonable if the interests of the other riparian State in the shared 
resource and the environmental protection of the latter were not taken into 
account. Consequently, it is the opinion of the Court that Article 27 embodies 
this interconnectedness between equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared 
resource and the balance between economic development and environmental 
protection that is the essence of sustainable development.168
Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which was re-affirmed in 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, recognises that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
164. Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), 
Order of 13 July 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep 113 at para 48.
165. Ibid and Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v 
Uruguay), Judgement, [2010] ICJ Rep 14.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid at para 80 [emphasis added].
168. Ibid at para 177 [emphasis added].
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pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction.169 
As noted by Schrijver and others, this principle of sovereignty over 
natural resources is well recognised in international law.170 Indeed, a right 
to sustainable use of natural resources, held by indigenous peoples against 
their own countries, and by States against other States, appears to be 
gaining further recognition in, for instance, recent decisions of regional 
human rights tribunals.171 This right to sustainable development, based 
on the principle of sovereignty and the duty to prevent activities within 
their control from causing damage outside their jurisdiction, provides 
the outer boundaries of the integration principle. It also obliquely 
addresses the social development dimension of sustainable development, 
as emphasized in the 2002 JPOI, if overlaps or conflicts occur.172 
169. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 34, Principle 21.
170. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, GA Res 3016 (XXVII), 
UNGAOR, 27th Sess, UN Doc A/Res/3016 (1972) 1. See Nico 
Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also Case Concerning 
East Timor (Portugal v Australia), Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Weeramantry, [1995] ICJ Rep 90 at 197-200; Case Concerning 
the Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland v Iceland), Merits, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Petren, [1974] 
ICJ Rep 3 at 161; Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Limited – New Application: 1962 (Belgium v Spain), Second 
Phase, Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup, [1970] ICJ Rep 3 at 165-67.
171. See Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Community (Paraguay) (2006), Inter-Am 
Ct HR (Ser C) at paras 137-41; Rights Case of the Saramaka Peoples 
(Suriname) (2007), Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser C) at paras 93-95, 122, 129-
32; Case of the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center 
for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria, [2002] 155/96 as published in 
(2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 937. 
172. Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How 
WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 137-43. But see Nancy Kontou, The 
Termination and Revision of Treaties in the Light of New Customary Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 145-47.
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An emerging customary “integration” principle does not provide a 
panacea for the process of treaty-making.173 States can deliberately elect 
to deviate from customary norms in their treaties, in accordance with the 
maxim pacta sunct servanda, in all but a few instances.174 It also remains 
disputed, in international law, whether the emergence of a new customary 
rule would lead to the revision of an earlier treaty which contradicts the 
norm.175 But under the VCLT, a customary norm of integration does 
become directly relevant for the interpretation of trade and investment 
treaties by tribunals. Or, as is more common in this field, it can become 
relevant for interpretation of an economic agreement by a sustainable 
development regulator seeking to understand the limits of their discretion. 
As noted in Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith, in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its 
terms in their context, and in the light of its object and purpose, and there 
shall be taken into account, together with the context, “any relevant rules 
173. Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3 at 118; Agenda 21, supra note 44, 
ch 39; French, supra note 127.
174. For instance, a treaty that deviates from jus cogens preremptory norms 
is invalid. See Hugh Thirlway, The Structure of International Legal 
Obligation, in Malcolm Evans, ed, International Law, 4d (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014) 117 at 137-38; Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public 
International Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 1998) at 74. See also 
Fisheries Case, supra note 143.
175. Hillier, ibid, “[c]ustomary law and treaty have equal authority. However if 
there is a conflict between the two it is the treaty that prevails” at 65. See 
also Wimbledon Case (1923), PCIJ (Ser A) No 1. 
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of international law applicable in the relations between the Parties”.176 
While the integration rule may not trump a clear obligation to ignore 
all environmental and social consequences, such a provision might be 
hard to secure presently, given the inter-actional dynamics and consensus 
policy context discussed above. In its absence, the regulator or treaty 
interpreter could appeal to the integration principle in order to interpret 
obligations that might, if understood in particular sense, risk causing or 
exacerbating trade and investment-led social and environmental damage. 
III. International Trade and Investment Agreements 
in Light of the Integration Principle
As highlighted by the Tribunal in the Iron Rhine award, Principle 4 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration provides that “environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it”.177 Just as States negotiate to secure access 
to foreign markets through a trade accord, States may also be seeking 
to negotiate to ensure economic agreements do not led to negative 
environmental and social consequences. This article concludes with a brief 
discussion of how the principle might assist in guiding the negotiation and 
176. VCLT, supra note 1, art 31(3)(c); See Pauwelyn, supra note 172 at 241; 
Jacques-Michel Grossen, Les Presomptions en Droit International Public 
(Neuchatel & Paris: Delachaux & Niestle, 1954) at 114-17 (where it 
is argued that customary norms are included among relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the Parties). See also 
Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984) at 119 (who suggests art 32(3)(c) 
may be taken to include not only the general rules of international law 
but also treaty obligations existing for the Parties, as followed in Al-Adsani 
v United Kingdom, No 35763/97, [2001] XI ECHR 761 [Al-Adsani]). 
And see Philippe Sands, “Treaty, Custom and Cross-fertilization of 
International Law” (1998) 1:1 Yale Human Rights and Development 
Law Journal 85 at 102-03 (who notes that while these norms are relevant, 
the treaty being interpreted retains a primary role and “there can be no 
question of the customary norm displacing the treaty norm, either partly 
or wholly” at 103). 
177. Rio Declaration, supra note 28.
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later interpretation of the provisions of trade and investment agreements, 
for the consideration of those developing new economic accords which 
make explicit commitments to sustainable development.
A. Addressing Sustainable Development Tensions 
in Trade and Investment Agreements through 
Integration
First, if sustainable development, as a policy objective, is explicitly 
recognised as part of the “object and purpose” of a trade agreement, might 
this recognition assist in treaty implementation? In international law, 
the object and purpose is important for interpretation. Article 31 of the 
VCLT, as a general rule of interpretation, provides at Article 31(1) that “A 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose”. And at Article 31(2), the Convention 
further states that: “[t]he context for the purpose of the interpretation 
of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble 
and annexes …”.178 In essence, the ordinary meaning of the terms of a 
treaty, in their context and taking into account the treaty’s stated object 
and purpose, are taken together to guide a lawyer in understanding the 
178. VCLT, supra note 1, art 2 (note also the relevance of “… (b) any 
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an 
instrument related to the treaty … (b) any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation; …. A special meaning shall be given to a 
term if it is established that the parties so intended”. Also, art 32 permits 
recourse to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion. 
These reflect pre-existing customary international law, applying to treaties 
concluded before the VCLT and also to non-Parties: Case Concerning the 
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad), [1994] ICJ Rep 6; 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia), [1999] ICJ Rep 1045; Case 
Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v 
Malaysia), [2002] ICJ Rep 625 at paras 37-38).
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intentions of the Parties, as the prevailing elements for interpretation.179 
As explained by Professor Richard Gardiner, the “object and purpose 
function as a means of shedding light on the ordinary meaning” of a 
treaty.180 
This solution is not quite so simple, however. The precise nature and 
role of the “object and purpose” of a treaty remains something of an 
enigma in the law of treaties.181 The combining of “object” and “purpose” 
in the VCLT has been ascribed in part to an ILC members’ suggestion 
in relation to the draft Article on pacta sunt servanda, that “the English 
word ‘objects’ be better rendered in French by the expression ‘l’objet et 
la fin’... for the object of an obligation was one thing and its purpose was 
another”.182 In French public law, as Buffard and Zemanek explain, a 
distinction has developed between “l’objet” of a legal instrument, which 
refers to the means chosen by the Parties to create a set of rights and 
obligations, and “le but” which refers to the reason(s) for establishing 
“l’objet” of the accord.183 The term “object” indicates thus the substantial 
content of the norm, the provisions, rights and obligations created by the 
norm. The object of a treaty is the instrument for the achievement of the 
treaty’s purpose, and this purpose is, in turn, the general goal or result 
which the [P]arties want to achieve by the treaty”.184 As Gardiner notes, 
while the Preamble provides guidance to discern the object and purpose 
179. Paul Reuter, Introduction to the Law of Treaties (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1995); Ravi Aryal, Interpretation of Treaties: Law and 
Practice (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 2003).
180. Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008) at 190.
181. Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: 
An Enigma?” (1998) 3 Austrian Review of International and European 
Law 311; Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
182. “Summary Records of the Sixteenth Session” (UN Doc A/CN 4/SER 
A/1964) in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol 1 (New 
York: UN, 1965) at 26 (UNDOC. A/CN4/SER.A/1965); Gardiner, supra 
note 180 at 191. See also Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, 
[1951] ICJ Rep 15 at 23, which actually uses “l”objet et le but”. 
183. Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 181 at 325-28, Gardiner, ibid at 192.
184. Buffard & Zemanek, ibid at 326.
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of a treaty, the whole treaty text and associated matter listed in Article 
31(2) should be taken into account as well. An object and purpose can 
also be discerned by comparing a treaty to others of its type, as the ICJ 
did in the Oil Platforms case by comparing the provisions of the 1955 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights between the United 
States of America and Iran,185 with others of treaties of friendship.186 This 
said, as the Appellate Body of the WTO has clarified, “most treaties have 
no single, undiluted object and purpose but rather a variety of different, 
and possibly conflicting, objects and purposes ... This is certainly true of 
the WTO Agreement”.187 Of importance for the instant discussion, the 
object and purpose of the treaty can be discerned, they are legally relevant 
for interpretation, and there may be more than one. 
The object and purpose of a treaty is raised multiple times in the 
VCLT, serving, for instance, as a means to determine the incompatibility 
of a reservation at Article 19(c), as a possible characteristic of a 
multilateral treaty to which reservations require the consent of all Parties 
at Article 20(2), as a way to characterise the material breach of a treaty 
at Article 60(3)(b), and as part of general guidance for interpretation 
at Article 31(1).188 This last point is especially important, as it guides 
the implementation of the agreements, arguably including the further 
evolution of the treaty regimes themselves.189 
Taking the guidance of Gardiner, Buffet and Zemanek into account, 
it can be noted that sustainable development is reflected as a “purpose” 
for over thirty treaties which explicitly commit to achieve it across a range 
of very diverse sectors and ways – particularly those highlighted by States 
as delivery mechanisms for the 2002 JPOI, and the 2015 SDGs.190 As just 
185. 15 August 1955, 284 UNTS 93 (entered into force 16 June 1957).
186. Oil Platforms (Iran v USA), [1996] ICJ Rep 803 at para 27.
187. WTO Agreement, supra note 4 at 17.
188. Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 181 at 320.
189. Ibid at 333; Gardiner, supra note 180 at 190-200.
190. Cordonier Segger & Khalfan, supra note 12 at 45-50 lists the treaties 
explicitly highlighted as international law in the field of sustainable 
development in the 2002 WSSD JPOI, including those which contain key 
provisions on sustainable development in addition to other environment, 
economic or social purposes. 
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one example, in the FAO Seed Treaty, the Parties establish a Multilateral 
System for Access and Benefit-Sharing that is meant to provide an 
efficient, effective and transparent framework to facilitate access to plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture, and to share the benefits in a 
fair and equitable way.191 In Objectives at Article 1.1, States agree that the 
“objectives of this Treaty are the conservation and sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture and the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of their use, in harmony with the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, for sustainable agriculture and food security”.192 
Sustainable use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture is an 
“object” of this international treaty, and overall sustainable agriculture is set 
as one of two ultimate purposes.193 Further, the Parties include provisions 
in Article 6 to define what is meant by sustainable use, committing to 
develop and maintain legal measures in this respect. At Article 6.1, the 
Contracting Parties accept a duty to “develop and maintain appropriate 
policy and legal measures that promote the sustainable use of plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture”.194 In Article 6.2, the Parties 
offer specific guidance what constitute these measures, for their treaty 
regime.195 Through careful debate in the treaty negotiations,196 further 
clarifications through the regime’s multi-lateral Conferences of the 
191. FAO Seed Treaty, supra note 130. The Multilateral System applies to 
over 64 major crops and forages. Resources may be obtained from the 
Multilateral System for utilization and conservation in research, breeding 
and training. When a commercial product is developed using these 
resources, equitable contributions are made to the System. The Governing 
Body sets out conditions for access and benefit-sharing in a “Material 
Transfer Agreement”.
192. FAO Seed Treaty, ibid, art 6 [emphasis added].
193. Muriel Lightbourne, “The FAO Multilateral System for Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture: Better than Bilateralism?” (2009) 30 
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 465 at 507.
194. FAO Seed Treaty, supra note 130, art 6.
195. Ibid.
196. Stewart Coupe & Robert Lewins, Negotiating the Seed Treaty 
(Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing, 2007). 
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Parties,197 guided by scholarly legal analysis, the regime has clarified their 
commitment to sustainable development.198 In this specific treaty sector, 
the Parties pinpointed the meaning of sustainable use of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, and operationalised their commitment 
in the treaty by agreeing on a set of legal measures for implementation. 
Although sustainable development may be recognised in Preambles as 
part of the purpose of many trade and investment agreements,199 such 
legal clarity has only begun to be sought in the context of economic 
treaty law.200 
B. Interpreting Sustainable Development Provisions in 
Economic Accords
While a joint intention of the Parties to promote sustainable development 
may be found in a trade or investment treaty Preamble, and may be 
considered part of the “object and purpose” of the accord in question, 
this recognition has limits. As Gardiner explains, according to the VCLT, 
though such recognition can shed light on the meaning of a provision 
within the context of the treaty itself, a broader or different “object and 
purpose” does not provide a valid means of challenging a clear operational 
term.201 Essentially, if a regulator from the EU or another Party sought to 
demonstrate that a clear obligation in a trade accord should be interpreted 
to accommodate the tensions identified above, in order to integrate 
environmental and social considerations, reference to a Preambular 
197. Report of the Third Session of the Governing Body of the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (Tunis, 
Tunisia, 1-5 June 2009) IT/GB-3/09/Report, online: Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations <www.fao.org/3/a-
be138e.pdf>.
198. Lightbourne, supra note 193.
199. Gehring & Cordonier Segger, supra note 4; Schrijver & Weiss, supra note 
112; Boyle & Freestone, supra note 11. 
200. Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3 at 123-27; Sampson, supra note 4 
at 78-109.
201. See Gardiner, supra note 180 at 74. 
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commitment alone may not provide the strongest guidance.202 
The VCLT, as noted earlier, enshrines customary rules of treaty 
interpretation. Article 30 governs the application of successive treaties 
relating to the same subject-matter, and may assist in the interpretation of 
treaty obligations which appear to differ, from sustainability commitments 
that are enshrined in other accords.203 Indeed, the tensions noted above 
do invoke certain types of conflicts among treaties. For instance, there 
may be a conflict where trade liberalisation obligations could constrain 
effective implementation of other treaty obligations which govern the 
same subject matter related to sustainable development. 
However, in international law, there is a generally accepted 
presumption against conflicts. As Pauwelyn explains, in theory every new 
treaty norm is created within the context of pre-existing international 
law, and the presumption is that this new norm builds upon the existing 
laws.204 Not only would an explicit conflict of norms need to be found 
in treaty text and proven by the claimant to limit an environmental or 
social measure, but if faced with two possible interpretations, one of 
which harmonises the meaning of the norms in question, the treaty 
will be “interpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in 
202. See also, ibid; Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-
Bissau v Senegal), [1991] 1CJ Rep 53 at 67-72; Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras), [1992] ICJ Rep 351 at paras 
375-76, the ICJ was unwilling to expand its jurisdiction beyond the very 
specific limits set out in the arbitration agreements, even to accommodate 
the express object and purpose of the accord it had identified; for cases 
where the WTO Appellate Body simply interpreted treaty provisions in 
the context of object and purpose; US-Shrimp, supra note 6 at 12-17; EC-
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) (1998), WTO 
Doc WT/DS26/AB/R at 70; Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard 
Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products (Complaint by Argentina) 
(2002), WTO Doc WT/DS207/AB/R at 196-97 (Appellate Body 
Report); and EC-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products (2006), WTO Doc WT/DS291/R at 4.162.
203. VCLT, supra note 1, art 30; see also Pauwelyn, supra note 172 at 361-85.
204. See Pauwelyn, ibid at 241; Grossen, supra note 176. 
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accordance with existing law and not in violation of it”.205
For a trade tribunal, or as is more likely in this field, for a regulator 
charged with interpreting a new trade obligation and how it will apply 
to efforts to secure more sustainable development in their sector of 
economic law and policy, it is therefore important under VCLT Article 
31 to look first to other provisions in the trade treaty in question, to see 
if there is further guidance provided in their ordinary meaning, in the 
context of the treaty, in light of its object and purpose, that can assist in 
interpreting the scope and application of problematic obligations. If little 
guidance appears in the text itself, an analysis might also be conducted 
under the lex posteriori and other rules of the VCLT at Article 30. But 
before applying formal rules, a careful analysis of the other provisions 
of the economic treaty in question is important, particularly as Parties 
may have included other provisions that are part of the treaty context 
and specifically address the issue being raised, or have made explicit 
references to further lex specialis, such as environmental or human rights 
treaties which govern the same subject matter.206 A careful search by the 
regulator may reveal textual solutions (or relevant ambiguities) in the 
trade or investment treaty itself. Certain types of provisions that could 
be present, particularly given Parties’ tendency to innovate in regional 
or bilateral trade and investment agreements, may be used to address a 
concern, avoiding a prima facie conflict of obligations.
From this textual interpretation viewpoint, other provisions in the 
treaty are therefore doubly important. In the examination of the terms 
of a trade or investment treaty, the interpretive rules of the VCLT will 
be relevant. The customary principle of integration can be taken into 
205. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Preliminary 
Objections), [1957] ICJ Rep 3 at 142. 
206. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons Case, Advisory Opinion, 
[1996] ICJ Rep 226; see also Martti Koskenniemi, International Law 
Commission Study Group on Fragmentation, Study on the function 
and scope of the lex specialist rule and the question of self-contained 
regimes (Geneva: International Law Commission, 2003) at 160, online: 
International Law Commission <legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/pdfs/
fragmentation_outline.pdf>; Gardiner, supra note 180 at 260.
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account in the interpretation of the terms of the trade and investment 
agreement itself.207 A great deal turns on the specific mechanisms agreed 
by the Parties to the trade or investment accord, and whether these 
measures include ways to integrate social and environmental priorities in 
order to prevent or at least mitigate the impacts in question.208 
207. VCLT, supra note 1, art 31(3)(c); French, supra note 127; Gardiner, 
supra note 180 at 288-91 (“[t]hat article 31(3)(c) may have a useful role 
in handling such potential conflicts has been considered in academic 
study, in the work of the ILC and in some instances ... invoked in ... 
rulings of courts and tribunals ... A particular issue in the realm of 
treaty implementation is what account is to be taken of developments in 
international law, particularly the striking emergence of new specialist 
fields such as environmental law and human rights law … the Court 
did give a clear indication that developments in environmental law were 
to be taken into account, and did so quite clearly in a context of treaty 
interpretation” at 331). See also Al-Adsani, supra note 176 
 (“[t]he Convention should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony 
with other rules of international law of which it forms part …” at para 
55); Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Case, supra note 110; Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa), notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, [1971] ICJ Rep 16 at 31 (“[a]n international instruments has 
to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal 
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation” at para 53); Iron Rhine, 
supra note 9 at 58 (“[a]n evolutive interpretation, which would ensure an 
application of the treaty that would be effective in terms of its object and 
purpose will be preferred to a strict application of the intertemporal rule” 
at para 80). See also International Law Commission, Report of the Study 
Group on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, UNGAOR, 58th Sess, 
A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) at 206-44. 
208. VCLT, ibid, art 31(3)(c) (the VCLT at art 31 permits interpretation to 
take into account, in addition to context and in light of the object and 
purpose, at art 31(3)(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable 
in the relations between the Parties); see also Pauwelyn, supra note 172 at 
251-56; Sinclair, supra note 176 (who suggests art 32(3)(c) may be taken 
to include not only the general rules of international law but also treaty 
obligations existing for the Parties, and customary law at 119); Sands, 
supra note 176 at 103 (who notes that in the sense of art 31(3)(c), the 
treaty being interpreted retains a primary role).
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In this respect, concerns raised by impact assessments and reviews 
become opportunities for the principle of integration to be taken into 
account in interpreting the treaty. First, the regulator can examine 
the economic treaty in question for provisions that would prevent 
the trade or investment disciplines from constraining the regulatory 
flexibility of the Parties for social and environmental purposes in the 
field of sustainable development. In the terms of Kelsen, there may be 
provisions in the economic treaty which grant a series of permissions, 
providing the Parties with exceptions to certain disciplines, where it can 
be shown that the disciplines might unduly constrain measures necessary 
to achieve other legitimate policy objectives. Should the overall treaty 
follow overwhelmingly along economic liberalisation in its context and 
structure, this could influence interpretation away from the preferred 
“integrated” outcome. However, general and specific exceptions, if found 
in the operational texts of the treaty, may provide clear exemptions that 
permit the sustainable development measures to be adopted. Similarly, 
provisions in a trade treaty itself or its preamble might set out an order 
of precedence between the accord and other treaties. If these provisions 
seem clear, the regulator would simply look, in good faith, to the context 
and the treaty object and purpose to confirm their ordinary meaning.209 
The context will include the treaty text, with its preamble and annexes, 
along with any agreement relating to the treaty, and also any instrument 
made by one or more Parties.210 If notes appear in an annex to the accord, 
clarifying that the treaty will not apply for certain economic sectors, 
such notes would be considered part of the treaty context, in addition 
209. See Gardiner, supra note 180; see also Aguas del Tunari v Bolivia (2005), 
ARB/02/3 (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) 
at para 21 (which notes the Vienna Convention does not privilege any 
of these three aspects of the interpretation method) and Humphrey 
Waldock, “Third Report” (UN Doc A/CN4/167) in Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1964, vol 1 (New York: UN, 1965) at 20 
(UNDOC. A/CN4/SER.A/1964) (which noted the need to interpret the 
treaty as a whole in good faith).
210. VCLT, supra note 1, art 31.2. 
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to any further agreements provided in the annexes.211 There is also the 
possibility to take into account any subsequent agreement between the 
Parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions, and this might include a subsequent joint statement between 
the Parties clarifying how the trade and investment rules should be 
interpreted to take customs into account.212 
Second, the regulator may find that there are provisions in the trade 
or investment agreement to secure environmental and social cooperation, 
or that such provisions run alongside the trade agreement in a separate 
accord. In Kelsen’s terms, these accords might include permissions or 
prescriptions to cooperate on key environmental and social problems, 
as well as mechanisms to investigate situations in which laws appear to 
be weakened or not enforced, and even in some cases, permissions to 
provide resources, capacity-building and other support for programs to 
address trade-related environmental and social concerns. Again, VCLT 
rules will be relevant to interpretation. There may be clearly operational 
terms of the treaty committing to ensure cooperation on environment, 
labour or sustainable development matters, and the regulator can consider 
these in context, and in light of any provisions showing a sustainable 
development object and purpose. Annexes that are provided can be taken 
into account as part of this context, as will side agreements which were 
made between all the Parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty, and there may also be separate memoranda of agreement which, 
if they were accepted as related to the trade and investment treaty by the 
other Parties, can be considered authentic means for interpretation.213 
Third, integrated substantive trade or investment liberalisation rules 
211. Ibid; in connection with the conclusion of the treaty that is accepted by 
the other Parties as an instrument related to the treaty, see art 31.2(b); if 
made by all the Parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, see 
art 31.2(a).
212. Ibid, art 31.3(a); see also “Reports of the Commission to the General 
Assembly” (UN Doc A/6309/Rev.1) in Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 1966, vol 2 (New York: United Nations, 1967) at para 15 
(UNDOC. A/CN4/SER.A/1966/Add.1). 
213. VCLT, ibid, arts 31.2, 31.2(a), 31.2(b); Gardiner, supra note 180 at 265-
75.
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may be included in the economic treaty itself, delivering sustainable 
development benefits through increases in liberalisation in targeted 
sustainable sectors of the economies, or for certain types of goods or 
services that meet an internationally agreed Sustainable Development 
Goal. Essentially, in Kelsen’s terms, the States would need to include 
prescriptive provisions that oblige the Parties to liberalise trade or 
investment in specific economic sectors that they agree will contribute 
to sustainable development. Again, the regulator might seek integral 
provisions which agree to promote trade in sustainable goods and services, 
or to develop new markets, together with annexes, side agreements, or 
separate memoranda of agreement.214 Such provisions, if the regulator 
finds them included in the text of the treaty, can assist in avoiding conflicts, 
and may have greater weight than turning to documents exchanged 
during treaty negotiations as travaux preparatoires as supplementary 
means of interpretation.215 From the textual viewpoint, therefore, it is 
important to consider the further provisions of a new economic treaty, 
particularly inasmuch as they might avoid conflicts of obligations. 
214. VCLT, ibid, art 31(3)(a) (which includes any subsequent agreements 
between the Parties as to interpretation or application of its provisions. 
Art 31(3)(b) also includes any subsequent practices in the application of 
the treaty which establish agreement of Parties regarding its interpretation. 
Gardiner stated, “an agreement as to the interpretation of a provision 
reached after the conclusion of the treat represents an authentic 
interpretation by the parties which must be read into the treaty for the 
purposes of its interpretation”, Gardiner, ibid at 34, 216-25). “Reports 
of the Commission to the General Assembly” (UN Doc A/6309/Rev.1) 
in Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1966, vol 2 (New York: 
United Nations, 1967) at para 14 (UNDOC. A/CN4/SER.A/1966/
Add.1); see also Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), [1999] ICJ 
Rep 1045 at para 49.
215. VCLT, ibid, art 32 (provides for supplementary means of interpretation to 
which recourse is often had, but which are used to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of art 31, or to determine meaning if the 
ordinary meeting in context and in light of the object and purpose is 
either left ambiguous or obscure, as per art 32(a) or leads to a result which 
is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, art 32(b)). See Gardiner, ibid at 
316-19. 
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As mentioned above, a further dimension of analysis is also 
important, informed by advances in international relations theory. Few 
international treaties today are simply textual contracts among States. 
As John Ruggie and Stephen Krasner have suggested, to understand the 
norms found in international treaties and how they are implemented, 
it is important to analyse the implicit understandings between a broad 
range of actors in a treaty regime, not only the formal views of States.216 
A regime is an institution that might coalesce or be structured around 
certain legal rules and certain formal organisations, but goes well beyond 
them, and develops iteratively.217 Such regimes, as posited by John Vogler, 
can be defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge 
in a given area of international relations”.218 Principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures are all necessary parts of an international 
treaty regime, which exists to achieve the common object and purpose of 
States and other international actors.219
Regimes, in international relations theory, therefore, can be 
216. John Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Ideas and 
Trends” (1975) 29 International Organization 557 at 557-83 [Ruggie, 
“International Responses”]. See also John Ruggie, “Reconstituting 
the Global Public Domain-Issues, Actors, and Practices” (2004) 10 
European Journal of International Relations 499 at 499-531 [“Ruggie, 
“Reconstituting the Global Public Domain”).
217. Ruggie, “International Responses”, ibid at 557-83; Ruggie, 
“Reconstituting the Global Public Domain”, ibid at 499-531.
218. John Vogler, ed, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological 
Governance, 2d (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 2000) at 20-43.
219. See especially John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions and 
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order” in 
Stephen Krasner, ed, International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983). See also Stephen Haggard & Beth Simmons, “Theories of 
International Regimes” (1987) 41 International Organization 491; Olav 
Stokke, “Regimes as Governance Systems” in Oran Young, ed, Global 
Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental Experience (Boston: 
MIT Press, 1997) at 27-64.
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described as governing specific issue areas in an interactive way.220 This 
distinguishes them from broader international orders which imply an 
authority superintending over a wide range of institutions and issues.221 
As such, regimes are more “specialised arrangements that pertain to 
well defined activities, resources or geographical areas and often involve 
only some subset of the members of international society”.222 As Vogler 
observes, the boundaries of a regime are thus determined partly by 
perceptions of the extent and linkage between issues. A regime analysis 
of trade and investment treaties calls attention to the way that principles, 
rules and decision-making procedures develop, interact and evolve in 
one “sub-system”, focusing on the converging expectations of a group 
of international actors. As noted by Stephen Toope and Jutta Brunnée, 
regime analysis can serve the study of international law, drawing on the 
“inter-actional” behaviours of legal subjects and rules originally observed 
by Lon L Fuller.223 Inter-actional regimes, as they note, coalesce around 
international treaty commitments, which evolve and deepen over time 
through interactions between states and non-state actors, shaping and 
being shaped by the norms and rules, knowledge and networks generated 
by the regime. 224 
From this perspective, both the “hard” and “soft” law between Parties 
to a treaty (or a series of treaties) evolves with the regime, engagement 
220. Oran Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural 
Resources and The Environment (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) as 
cited in Vogler, supra note 218 at 23.
221. Vogler, ibid at 20-43.
222. Young, supra note 220 at 23.
223. See Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, “International Law and 
Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International 
Law” (2000) 39:1 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19 at 19-74 
[Brunnée & Toope, “International Law and Constructivism”]; see also 
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, “The Changing Nile Basin Regime: 
Does Law Matter?” (2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 105 at 
105-59. 
224. See Brunnée & Toope, “International Law and Constructivism”, ibid 
at 19-74; see also Jutta Brunnée & Stephen Toope, “Persuasion and 
Enforcement: Explaining Compliance with International Law” (2002) 
XIII Finnish Yearbook of International Law 1 at 1-23.
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a broader spectrum of actors than the States in its implementation.225 A 
regime may start with a legally binding agreement with broad participation 
but shallow substantive commitments, then deepen in substantive 
content and engagement of more and better informed actors, leading 
to greater compliance over time. As such, the emergence, evolution and 
effects of normative systems can coalesce around a particular object and 
purpose in international law, reinforced by “epistemic communities” 
which share scientific information and data.226 In certain circumstances, 
it may be undesirable to negotiate seemingly strong international treaties 
without first going through a careful, incremental process of regime-
building. Without it, formal legal commitments are unlikely to be 
meaningful; States may simply assent with no intention of complying, 
or no capacity to comply.227 As Brunnée and Toope suggest, once a 
contextual agreement (such as a framework convention) initiates the 
development of self-reinforcing norms and institutions, regimes can then 
evolve in the direction of deeper substantive legal commitments. A steady 
building process, focused on the object and purpose of the treaty, may 
yield increasingly complex and sophisticated regimes of nearly universal 
application.228 For other treaties on sustainable development, such as the 
1992 UNCBD229 and the 1992 UNFCCC,230 it has been convincingly 
argued that States established framework agreements which commit to 
certain common objects and purposes, and a process by which further 
more detailed and specific protocols are negotiated.231 In emerging trade 
and investment regimes, from this perspective, it is possible that while 
agreed provisions appear likely to generate the tensions discussed above, 
225. Dinah Shelton, International Law and Relative Normativity in Malcolm 
Evans, ed, International Law, 4d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
at 159-63. See also Birnie, Boyle & Redgwell, supra note 3.
226. Shelton, ibid; See also Jutta Brunnée, “COPing with Consent: 
Lawmaking under Multilateral Environmental Agreements” (2002) 15:1 
Leiden Journal of International Law 1 at 1-52.
227. Brunnée, ibid at 5-6.
228. Ibid at 33-37. 
229. Ibid.
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid at 37-38.
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as the regime continues to evolve, new purposes can be accepted by the 
Parties, and new operational instruments negotiated to take evolving 
customary law into account. For instance, even if the WTO Agreements 
did not originally include sustainable development as part of the purpose, 
and even if there were WTO Members that had persistently objected to 
a principle of integration in customary law, the WTO may still be able 
to evolve as a regime for an eventual acceptance of this objective, taking 
into account an integration principle in certain areas of its work, and 
in that context, new obligations may be negotiated within the regime 
framework. 
Whether one departs from a purposive, a textual or a regime 
perspective, if it is desirable to integrate social and environmental 
concerns into trade treaties for sustainable development, either for sound 
international policy reasons, or out of respect for an emerging customary 
principle of integration, or simply to achieve a common textual sustainable 
development goal that is set as an “object and purpose” of the trade and 
investment treaty instrument itself (either in a new accord, or as a new 
commitment while a treaty and investment regime evolves), the question 
remains as to which provisions might best be interpreted as doing so 
effectively. More research is necessary to identify and understand the 
types of obligations that might be included, in a manner similar to the 
FAO Seed Treaty Article 6, to add clarity to a commitment for sustainable 
development in an international trade and investment treaty.232 
IV. Conclusions
In international debates on trade and investment, the environment 
and human rights, there have been significant concerns about the 
sustainability of entering into economic agreements which might lead 
to serious environmental and social impacts. In light of two decades of 
global and regional “soft law” commitments to sustainable development 
232. See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Athena’s Treaties: Crafting Integrated 
Trade and Investment Accords for Sustainable Development (forthcoming, 
2018).
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through trade and investment, States may have legitimate expectations 
that these concerns will be addressed. Given the extensive global consensus 
on the importance of sustainable development, particularly if sustainable 
development has been included by Parties as part of the “object and 
purpose” of trade and investment treaties, or has an interstitial influence 
on the process of economic treaty negotiations, certain customary norms 
may be useful to address the tensions. The principle of integration, 
as defined in Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration and supplemented by 
social considerations from the 2002 JPOI, can be considered particularly 
relevant for trade, investment and other economic policy-making. 
Notwithstanding its potential interpretive weight as part of the object and 
purpose of a treaty, a preambular reference alone in a trade or investment 
treaty may not provide a comprehensive response to the tensions that are 
being identified in assessments and current political debates. By applying 
greater creativity and craftsmanship in treaty drafting, increasingly 
adopting additional measures that address actual environmental or human 
rights tensions and concerns, States can convert trade and investment law 
tensions to opportunities for sustainable development. As tribunals and 
regulators take up these accords for implementation and enforcement, 
such mechanisms can and should be interpreted in light of the emerging 
integration principle, supporting the achievement of global Sustainable 
Development Goals. 
